The Lord said to Satan, “Behold, he is in your hand, but spare his life.” Then Satan went out from the presence of the Lord and struck Job with painful boils. Job 2:6-7
No temptation has overtaken you except such as is common to man; but God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able. 1 Corinthians 10:13
My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various trials, knowing that the testing of your faith produces patience. James 1:2
Let no one say when he is tempted, “I am tempted by God”; for God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does He himself tempt anyone. But each one is tempted when he is drawn away by his own desires and enticed. James 1:14
The Lord is not slack concerning His promise, as some count slackness, but is longsuffering toward us, not willing that any should perish but that all should come to repentance. 2 Peter 3:9
This, therefore, was the [object of the] longsuffering of God: that man may always live in a state of gratitude to the Lord. For, having passed through all types of trials, then acquiring the knowledge of moral discipline, then attaining to the resurrection from the dead and learning through experience who is the Source of his deliverance, and finally having obtained from Him the gift of incorruptibility, man might love Him the more. Irenaeus (c. 180, E/W), 1.450
Those who flee from the eternal light of God (which contains all good things in itself) are their own cause of inhabiting eternal darkness, which is destitute of good things. Irenaeus (c. 180, E/ W), 1.523
Evil has sprung from voluntary apostasy. Yet, it is the greatest achievement of divine providence not to allow this evil to remain useless. . . . For it is the work of the divine wisdom . . . to ensure that whatever happens through the evils hatched by someone, a good and useful result will come of it. Clement of Alexandria (c. 195, E), 2.320
Although disease, accident, and . . . death come upon the spiritual man, . . . by the power of God they become the medicine of salvation. Through discipline, they benefit those who are difficult to reform. They are allotted according to what is deserved by providence, which is truly good. Clement of Alexandria (c. 195, E), 2.540
He deals with all sorts of men alike, so that all men together share His favors and reproofs. His will is that both the elect and the outcasts should have adversities and prosperities in common. In that way, we will all experience both His goodness and His severity. Having learned these things from His own lips, we love His goodness and fear His wrath. Tertullian (c. 197, W), 3.48
While morbidly brooding over the question of the origin of evil, [Marcion’s] perception became blunted by the very irregularity of his researches. . . . So he concluded from other arguments (which are satisfactory only to a perverted mind) that God is the author of evil. Tertullian (c. 207, W), 3.272
These are the bones of contention, which you are perpetually gnawing: If God is good and foreknows the future, and is able to avert evil, why did He permit man, the very image and likeness of Himself, . . . to be deceived by the devil, and fall from obedience of the law into death? . . . In reply, we must first vindicate those attributes in the Creator that are called into question. . . . I find, then, that God constituted man to be free, master of his own will and power. Tertullian (c. 207, W), 3.300-301
The liberty of man will—after a second thought—show us that man’s liberty alone can be charged with the fault that it committed itself. . . . Therefore, the necessary consequence was that God had to separate His foreknowledge and power from the liberty that He had once for all bestowed upon man. He did this even though He might have prevented man’s falling into danger when attempting to enjoy his liberty wrongly. Yet, if God had intervened, He would have rescinded the liberty of man’s will, which He had permitted for a specific purpose. Tertullian (c. 207, W), 3.303
If man failed to make the most of the good gift he had received, he must see how that he was himself guilty in respect of the law that he did not choose to keep. Tertullian (c. 207, W), 3.303
As, therefore, God designed for man a condition of life, so man brought on himself a state of death. And this was neither through infirmity nor through ignorance. Tertullian (c. 207, W), 3.303
By allowing a permission for the operation of [Satan’s] designs, God acted consistently with the purpose of His own goodness. He deferred the devil’s destruction for the very same reason that He postponed the restitution of man. For He afforded room for a conflict, wherein man might crush his enemy with the same freedom of his will as had made him succumb to Satan. This proves that the fault was all his own, not God’s. [And it enables man] to worthily recover his salvation by a victory. In this way, also, the devil receives a more bitter punishment, by being vanquished by him whom he had previously injured. By these means, God is discovered to be so much the more good. For He has waited for man to return from his present life to a more glorious Paradise, with a right to eat of the tree of life. Tertullian (c. 207, W), 3.306
If it is His will that men should do the things they are commanded, why did He not create men in such a manner that they could not be able to do wrong? . . . God, in His goodness, chose not to make man [like the inanimate objects]. Rather, by his freedom, He exalted man above many of His creatures. Bardesanes (c. 222, E), 8.723-724
God also knows the secret things of the heart and foresees future events. In His long-suffering, He permits things to happen. And by means of those things that happen outside ourselves, He reveals the secret evil within a person in order to cleanse him. . . . For God governs souls not with reference . . . to the fifty years of the present life, but with reference to an unlimited age. Origen (c. 225, E), 4.314
It might be maintained that if all things were made through the Logos, and evil is a part of all things, then the whole matter of sin—and everything that is wicked—were also made through the Logos. But we must regard this as false. . . . In respect that he is the devil, he is not the work of God. Yet, he who is the devil is a created being. Since there is no other Creator but our God, he is a work of God. It is as if we should say that a murderer is not a work of God. However, we would also say that as to his being a man, God made him. He received his existence as a man from God. However, we do not say that he received his existence as a murderer from God. Origen (c. 228, E), 9.330-331
A person should inquire instead why it was not possible for God . . . to create men who needed no improvement, but who were of themselves virtuous and perfect. Why is it not possible for evil to be completely non-existent? These questions may perplex ignorant and foolish individuals, but not someone who sees into the nature of things. For if you take away the spontaneity of virtue, you destroy its essence. Origen (c. 248, E), 4.498
On the other hand, we maintain that evil, wickedness, and the actions that proceed from them were not created by God. For if God created that which is truly evil, how is it possible that the proclamation regarding the Judgment should be confidently announced? For it informs us that the wicked are to be punished for their evil deeds in proportion to the amount of their wickedness. At the same time, those who have lived a virtuous life, or performed virtuous actions, will have the enjoyment of blessedness and will receive rewards from God. I am well aware that those who would daringly assert that these evils were created by God will quote certain expressions of Scripture, for we are not able to show one consistent series of passages. For, although Scripture blames the wicked and approves of the righteous, it nevertheless contains some statements which—although comparatively few in number—seem to disturb the minds of ignorant readers of Holy Scripture. Origen (c. 248, E), 4.598
[CELSUS, THE PAGAN CRITIC:] “All things are ordered according to God’s will. His providence governs all things. Is not everything that happens in the universe regulated by the law of the Most High God—whether it is the work of God, angels, demons, or heroes?” . . . [ORIGEN’S REPLY:] We must inquire into the meaning of the statement, “all things are ordered according to God’s will.” We must determine if Celsus means that sins are included among the things that God orders. For if God’s government extends to sins, . . . it follows that all sins and all their consequences are ordered by the will of God. And this is a different thing than saying that they come to pass with God’s permission. . . . When we say that “the providence of God regulates all things,” we utter a great truth if we attribute to that providence nothing but what is just and right. But if we attribute to the providence of God all things whatever—however unjust they may be—then it is no longer true that the providence of God regulates all things. . . . We cannot say that transgressors follow the law of God when they transgress. Origen (c. 248, E), 4.638
Many men have expressed opinions on the origin of evil. Prior to you and me, no doubt, there have been many capable men who have made the most searching inquiry into the matter. Methodius (c. 290, E), 6.358
Now, these [evil] things are produced by men. Men, therefore, are the authors of them and the causes of their existing or not existing. Methodius (c. 290, E), 6.360
Man, after his creation, received a commandment from God. And from this, evil quickly arose. For man did not obey the divine command. And this alone is evil: disobedience, which had a beginning. Methodius (c. 290, E), 6.362
God did not make evil. Nor is He at all in any way the Author of evil. But whoever failed to keep the law . . . after being created by God with the faculty of free will . . . is called evil. Methodius (c. 290, E), 6.364
Death was appointed by God for the sinner, so that evil might not remain forever. Methodius (c. 290, E), 6.370, as quoted by Photius
Someone will say, “Then why does God permit these [evil] things to be done? Why does He not apply a remedy to such disastrous errors?” [He permits them] so that evils may be contrasted with the good. So that vices may be contrasted with virtues. The result is that He will have some whom He will punish and others whom He will honor. For He has determined at the last times to pass judgment on the living and the dead. . . . So He delays this until the end of the times has come. Lactantius (c. 304–313, W), 7.66-67
God arranged that there would be this distinction between good and evil things so that we can know the value of the good from [observing] that which is evil. We can also recognize the meaning of evil from [observing] the good. The nature of either one cannot be fully comprehended if the other one is taken away. So in order that the nature of virtue could be evident, God did not banish evil. For how could patient endurance have any meaning and name if there were nothing that we were forced to endure? How could faith . . . deserve praise, unless there were someone who wished to turn us away from God? For this reason, God permitted the unjust to be more powerful . . . and to be more numerous, so that virtue might be precious on account of its rarity. Lactantius (c. 304–313, W), 7.142
Reason itself and necessity require that both good and evil things should be set before man: good things that he can use, and evil things that he can guard against and avoid. Lactantius (c. 304–313, W), 7.199
Someone may ask, “From where did sins extend to man? Or what perversion distorted the rule of the divine institution to worse things?” . . . God permitted the evil for this reason: that the good might also shine forth. Lactantius (c. 304–313, W), 7.272
For this reason God does not immediately punish everyone who is guilty: so that man may have the opportunity of correcting himself, coming to a right mind. Lactantius (c. 304–313, W), 7.277
They will ask, “Why, then, does not the Almighty God take away these evils? Why does he allow them to exist and to go on without ceasing through all the ages?” . . . We must answer that we do not know these things. Arnobius (c. 305, E), 6.454; extended discussion: 6.356–363