You have heard that it was said, “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” But I tell you not to resist an evil person. But whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn the other to him also. Matt. 5:28, 29.
He is God’s minister to you for good. But if you do evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword in vain; for he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him who practices evil. Rom. 13:4.
When they know that we cannot endure even to see a man put to death, though justly, who of them can accuse us of murder? . . . We consider that to see a man put to death is much the same as killing him. Therefore, we have sworn away from such [gladiatorial] spectacles. We do not even look on, lest we might contract guilt and pollution. So how can we put people to death? Athenagoras (c. 175, E), 2.147.
Let us suppose that it is possible for anyone to succeed in working under the mere name of the public office, in whatever office, and that he neither sacrifices nor lends his authority to sacrifices. . . . Furthermore, suppose that he neither sits in judgment on anyone’s life or character (for you might allow his judging about money). Suppose that he neither condemns nor indicts anyone. Suppose he neither chains, imprisons, nor tortures anyone. Can anyone believe that all this is possible? Tertullian (c. 200, W), 3.72.
Now, inquiry is made about whether a believer may enter into military service. Likewise, it is asked whether those in the military can be admitted into the faith—even the rank and file, or any inferior grade, to whom there is no necessity for taking part in sacrifices or capital punishments. Tertullian (c. 200, W), 3.73.
These barbarous sentences of death consign the criminal who has committed murder—while yet alive—to various wild beasts (which are selected and trained even against their nature for their horrible office). In fact, [the criminal] is hindered from too easily dying, by a contrivance that retards his last moment in order to aggravate his punishment. But even if his soul should have anticipated the sword’s last stroke and departed, his body at any event does not escape the weapon. Retribution of his own crime is yet exacted by stabbing his throat and stomach, and piercing his side. After that, he is flung into the fire, so that his very grave may be cheated. In no other way, indeed, is a sepulcher allowed him. . . . In fact, no mercy is shown to his bones; no indulgence to his ashes. Even these are punished with exposure and nakedness. The vengeance that is inflicted among men upon the murderer is really as great as that which is imposed by nature. Who would not prefer the justice of the world, which, as the apostle himself testifies, “does not bear the sword in vain”? For it is an institution of religion when it severely avenges in defense of human life. When we contemplate, too, the penalties assigned to other crimes—gallows, burnings, sacks, harpoons, and precipices—who would not think it better to receive his sentence in the courts of Pythagoras and Empedocles? Tertullian (c. 210, W), 3.214.
Christians could not slay their enemies. Nor could they condemn those who had broken the Law to be burned or stoned, as Moses commands. . . . However, in the case of the ancient Jews, who had a land and a form of government of their own, to take from them the right of making war upon their enemies, of fighting for their country, of putting to death or otherwise punishing adulterers, murderers, or others who were guilty of similar crimes, would have been to subject them to sudden and utter destruction whenever the enemy fell upon them. Origen (c. 248, E), 4.618.
Christians do not attack their assailants in return, for it is not lawful for the innocent to kill even the guilty. Cyprian (c. 250, W), 5.351.
He who reckons it a pleasure that a man—though justly condemned—should be slain in his sight, pollutes his conscience as much as if he should become a spectator and a sharer of a murder that is secretly committed. Yet, they call these “sports,” in which human blood is shed! Lactantius (c. 304–313, W), 7.186.
When God forbids us to kill, He not only prohibits us from the open violence that is not even allowed by the public laws, but He also warns us against doing those things that are esteemed lawful among men. Thus it will not be lawful for a just man to engage in warfare, since his warfare is justice itself. Nor is it lawful for him to accuse anyone of a capital crime. For it makes no difference whether you put a man to death by word or by the sword. For it is the act of putting to death itself that is prohibited. Therefore, with regard to this commandment of God, there should be no exception at all. Rather, it is always unlawful to put a man to death, whom God willed to be a sacred creature. Lactantius (c. 304–313, W), 7.187.
Not as if all killing were wicked, but only that of the innocent. However, the killing that is just is reserved to the magistrates alone. Apostolic Constitutions (compiled c. 390, E), 7.466.